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George J. Mailath's Working Papers
08-027
George J. Mailath
Wojciech Olszewski
"FolkTheorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring", Second Version
08-019
George J. Mailath
Wojciech Olszewski
"Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring"
07-034
Geroge J. Mailath
"Reputation Effects"
07-024
V. Bhaskar
George J. Mailath
Stephen Morris
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", Second Version
07-022
GeorgeJ. Mailath
Georg Noldeke
"Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?"
07-018
Martin W. Cripps
Jeffrey C. Ely
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Common Learning"
06-003
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
"Social Assets", Third Version
05-014
George J. Mailath
Stephen Morris
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring", Second Version
04-033
George J. Mailath
Stephen Morris
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring"
04-031
Martin W. Cripps
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships", Second Version
04-025
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
"Social Assets", Second Version
04-008
Martin W. Cripps
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships"
04-007
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
Larry Samuelson
"Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices", Second Version
04-004
V. Bhaskar
George J. Mailath
Stephen Morris
"Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma"
03-021
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
Larry Samuelson
"Contempraneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria", Second Version: August 15, 2003
03-018
George J. Mailath
Volker Nocke
Andrew Postlewaite
"Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives", Second Version: June 23, 2003
03-016
Martin W. Cripps
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations", Second Version: May 30, 2003
03-014
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
Larry Samuelson
"Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices"
02-035
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
"The Social Context of Economic Decisions"
02-021
Martin W. Cripps
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations"
02-018
George J. Mailath
Volker Nocke
Andrew Postlewaite
"The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities", Second Version: July 11, 2002
02-012
George J. Mailath
Volker Nocke
Andrew Postlewaite
"The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities", First Version: May 20, 2002
02-004
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
Larry Samuelson
"Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria"
02-003
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
"Social Assets"
01-014
George J. Mailath
Ichiro Obara
Tadashi Sekiguchi
"The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma"
01-009
George J. Mailath
Steven A. Matthews
Tadashi Sekiguchi
"Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring"
98-009
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Who Wants a Good Reputation?"
98-008
Harold L. Cole
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
"Efficient Non-Contractible Investments"
98-006
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
"Your Reputation is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like to Be"
98-004
George J. Mailath
Stephen Morris
"Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective"
98-002
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
Avner Shaked
"Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search"
98-001
George J. Mailath
"Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory"
97-011
George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
Jeroen M. Swinkels
"How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?"
97-006
George J. Mailath
"Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions"
97-003
Harold L. Cole
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite
"Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms"